FACTS
The facts of the present case indicate that the spouse of the appellant had a prior marriage which ended as a result of the death of his wife after which the appellant married him. The appellant’s spouse had two biological children from his first marriage. The appellant had requested the authorities at PGIMER to enter the names of the two children born from the first marriage of her spouse in the official service record.
Afterwards, the appellant sought maternity leave on the birth of her first biological child. The request of the appellant for the grant of maternity leave was rejected on the ground that she had two surviving children and had availed of child care leave earlier for the two children born from the first marriage of her spouse. Consequently, maternity leave for the child borne by her, considered as her third child, was found to be inadmissible in terms of the Rules of 1972.
Aggrieved by the decisions at PGIMER, the appellant moved the Central Administrative Tribunal. However, the Tribunal dismissed the application stating that “maternity leave can be granted to a female government servant only if she has less than two surviving children. As per her own request, the applicant has already shown her two children from the first marriage of her husband as her children and she has been availing benefit in their respect on many occasions earlier and subsequent to her marriage.”
After this decision, the appellant moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, calling into question the judgment of the Tribunal. However, the High Court upheld the ruling of the CAT. Thus, the present appeal.
OBSERVATIONS & DISCUSSION
I. Maternity Leave
The court took perusal of the Child care leave as provided under Rule 43-C that provides that any woman government servant having minor children may take child care leave for a maximum period of two years. Further, the court also took into consideration the interpretation of Rule 43 of the Rules of 1972, that talk about the grant of maternity leave to women with less than two surviving children.
The court also took into consideration the precedents set in KH Nazar vs. Mathew K Jacob, Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers which state that beneficial legislation must be given a liberal approach, courts must bridge the gap between law and society through the use of purposive interpretation and that the Rules of 1972 have been formulated to enhance the objects under Article 15 of the Constitution.
The court, after considering all these precedents stated that the grant of child care leave in respect of her step-children mya have been a matter on which a compassionate view was taken by the authorities at the relevant time. The court noted that gendered roles assigned to women and societal expectations mean that women are always pressed upon to take a disproportionate burden of childcare work.
The court also stated that women in India spend up to 352 minutes per day on unpaid work (including childcare), 577% more than the time spent by men. The court was of the opinion that women continue to bear the primary responsibility for childcare.
Thus, it held that the grant of child care leave to the appellant cannot be used to disentitle her to maternity leave under Rule 43 of the Rules of 1972.
Unless a purposive interpretation were to be adopted in the present case, the object and intent of the grant of maternity leave would simply be defeated. The grant of maternity leave under Rules of 1972 is intended to facilitate the continuance of women in the workplace.
“It is a harsh reality that but for such provisions, many women would be compelled by social circumstances to give up work on the birth of a child, if they are not granted leave and other facilitative measures. No employer can perceive child birth as detracting from the purpose of employment.”
II. Concept of family
The bench also observed that the traditional definition of a “family” is problematic as it ignores both the various circumstances that may lead to a change in the familial structure and the fact that many families do not conform to this expectation to begin with.
It observed that the term familial relationships may take the form of domestic, unmarried partnerships or queer relationships. Thus, observing that atypical family units are also entitled to equal protection under law.
“These manifestations of love and of families may not be typical but they are as real as their traditional counterparts. Such atypical manifestations of the family unit are equally deserving not only of protection under law but also of the benefits available under social welfare legislation.”
CONCLUSION
With this, the court stated that when the appellant applied to PGIMER for maternity leave, PGIMER was faced with facts that the law may not have envisaged or adequately accounted for. When courts are confronted with such situations, they would do well to attempt to give effect to the purpose of the law in question rather than to prevent its application. Thus, the court held that the appellant was entitled to the grant of maternity leave. The SC set aside the judgment of the high court and ordered for the benefits to be released to the appellant within a period of two months.
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